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CASES NOTED
LANDLORD'S OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE LIFEGUARD:
A POOL PENUMBRA
Plaintiff, both individually under the wrongful death statute, and as
administrator of the estate under the survival statute,2 brought a tort
action to recover damages for the death of his son who drowned in de-
fendant's swimming pool. Plaintiff was a tenant in the apartment building
owned and operated by the defendant. The swimming pool had neither
lifeguard supervision nor rescue equipment. Recovery was sought upon
two theories: (1) violation of a Florida State Board of Health Regulation
requiring lifeguards and lifesaving apparatus; and (2) breach of a com-
mon law duty of reasonable care to provide for rescue and recovery. On
defendant's motion, the complaint was dismissed for failure to state a
cause of action. Plaintiff amended the complaint, defendant moved to
dismiss the amended complaint, and the trial judge again granted the
motion to dismiss. On appeal to the District Court of Appeal of Florida,
Third District, held, reversed and remanded: A complaint alleging that
the drowning death of a tenant's son in the swimming pool of an apart-
ment house owned and operated by defendant was the proximate result
of defendant's failure to have rescue equipment and a lifeguard available
stated a cause of action upon the theory that the landlord breached a
common law duty to an invitee. Smith v. Jung, 241 So.2d 874 (Fla. 3d
Dist. 1970).
American courts and legislatures, appreciating that certain activities
by their very nature require supervision, have afforded protection to the
swimmer by holding that lifeguards and rescue equipment are indispens-
able to the safe operation of pools.3 However, these obligations were im-
posed only upon the swimming pool owner operating for profit who
"invites" members of the public to enter. In the instant case, a court,
for the first time, squarely holds that in those instances where a private
apartment house owner has a duty of reasonable care, this duty may
include providing a lifeguard at the apartment pool.
One of the first Florida cases dealing with liability for the failure to
provide lifeguards is McKinney v. Adams.4 There, the Supreme Court of
Florida held that a complaint alleging that the negligent failure of an
owner of a public bathhouse on the Atlantic Ocean to provide lifelines,
life rafts, and lifeguards, resulting in the drowning death of a patron,
1. FLA. STAT. § 768.03 (1969).
2. Id.
3. See generally Annot., 1 A.L.R.3d 963 (1965) (hotel, motel, and private dub swimming
pools); Annot., 48 A.L.R.2d 104 (1956) (private swimming pool operated for profit); Annot.,
55 A.L.R. 1434 (1928) (municipally operated pools and beaches).
4. 68 Fla. 208, 66 So. 988 (1914).
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did state a cause of action. Liability was established by statute5 as to the
lifelines and rafts, but as to the lifeguards, the court relied on the common
law. In finding a breach of a common law duty to provide a lifeguard, the
court stated:
All of these precautions [lifeguards and rescue equipment] may
be the duties of the operator of the place who offers its use to
the public if the circumstances make such precautions reason-
ably necessary or expedient for the safety to those who use the
waters in the customary way."
Municipalities operating public swimming pools come under this rule
of liability,7 as do owners of private pools operated for profit.' The raison
d'etre in many of these cases is that those who furnish a fee for the use
of swimming pools should, in return, be furnished lifeguard service.'
Moreover, the inherently dangerous nature of a pool itself gives rise to
such a duty.i °
The common law requirement to provide lifeguards has also been
extended to private membership clubs, the area most analogous to the
instant case. In Rovegno v. San Jose Knights of Columbus Hall Associa-
tion," the Knights of Columbus operated a pool for members and their
guests. The members paid dues, and their guests paid a fifty cent charge.
A nineteen-year-old member drowned, and the wrongful death suit alleged
negligence in failing to provide adequate persons skilled in lifesaving. The
court, in reversing a directed verdict for the defendant, held that the
degree of care of the private association "would approximate the amount
chargeable to the proprietor of an institution to which the public gen-
erally was invited." 2 While, at first blush, it might appear that the
Rovegno court found the duty for both private and public pool owners to
be identical, in actuality, it was nothing more than the court looking
beyond the defendant's private facade and recognizing its public scope. 3
The existence of a duty to provide lifeguards imposed on those pools
where the public pays a fee to enter led to the question of whether the
5. See FLA. STAT. § 514.01 (1969).
6. 68 Fla. 208, 229, 66 So. 988, 993 (1914).
7. Pickett v. City of Jacksonville, 155 Fla. 439, 20 So.2d 484 (1945); DeSimone v.
Philadelphia, 380 Pa. 137, 110 A.2d 431 (1955).
8. Schweitzer v. Gilmore, 251 F.2d 171 (2d Cir. 1958) (resort); McKinney v. Adams,
68 Fla. 208, 66 So. 988 (1914); Brumm v. Goodall, 16 11. App. 2d 212, 147 N.E.2d 699
(1958).
9. "Ordinary care to provide a reasonably sufficient number of attendants for the protec-
tion of bathers at a public bathing resort conducted for private gain is a standard of duty
in that respect." Pickett v. City of Jacksonville, 155 Fla. 439, 444, 20 So.2d 484, 487 (1945)
(emphasis added).
10. Smith v. Jung, 241 So.2d 874, 876 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
11. 108 Cal. App. 591, 291 P. 848 (1930).
12. Id. at 597, 291 P. at 850.
13. Even though the defendant was a private association, the fact that the pool could
be used by six or seven hundred people, together with the admission fee, actually made the
operation one run for profit.
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same duty was incumbent upon the owner of an apartment house pool.
The court in Smith stated: "The distinction that the McKinney case in-
volved a swimming facility furnished to business invitees on a fee basis,
does not appear material."' 4 Nevertheless, the analytics of landlord liabil-
ity are essential to a determination of the true common law duty.
Generally, courts hold that a landlord is not liable to a tenant for
injuries received on the property during the term of the lease. 5 The ap-
parent rationale lies in the time-worn phrase "caveat emptor."'8 Implicit
in the concept, however, is the fact that the lease is, in fact, a sale of the
land for a term under which the landlord relinquishes control over the
part demised and, therefore, should not be accountable for defects ap-
parent to the lessee when he signed the lease.' However, the broad rules
of non-liability do not relieve the landlord of liability for those parts of
the land retained in his control which he permits the tenants to use.' 8 The
tenants are "invitees"' 9 of those common areas, to whom the landlord
owes the affirmative duty of exercising reasonable care.2 0
In determining whether the requirement of reasonable care over the
common pool area embodied lifeguards and rescue equipment, the court
was aware of the ostensible lack of precedent1.2  Additionally, while the
tenant argued that a State Board of Health regulation pertaining to life-
guards and rescue equipment applied to apartment houses, the court
found that it was inapplicable.22 Nevertheless, in order to extend the
lifeguard requirement to the factual situation, the court made use of the
Board of Health regulation by holding that it could be presented in
evidence to the jury to help in their determination of the common law
14. 241 So.2d 874, 876 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
15. 32 Am. JuR. Landlord & Tenant § 654 (1941); 20 Fa. JuR. Landlord & Tenant §
113 (1958).
16. Butler v. Maney, 146 Fla. 33, 200 So. 226 (1941).
17. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 63 (1964).
18. Cavezzi v. Cooper, 47 So.2d 860 (Fla. 1950) ; Butler v. Maney, 146 Fla. 33, 200 So.
226 (1941) ; Conroy v. Briley, 191 So.2d 601 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
19. Butler v. Maney, 146 Fla. 33, 38, 200 So. 226, 228 (1941).
20. Id.
21. "Research fails to disclose any case in the State of Florida or from any other juris-
diction wherein the providing of a lifeguard for an apartment house has been referred to."
Smith v. Jung, 241 So.2d 874, 878 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970) (dissenting opinion).
22. Counsel for the landlord argued that State Board of Health Regulation 12D-5.21
was invalid, and therefore 1OD-5.02 (3), applying the regulation to apartment houses, was
inapplicable. The contention advanced was that while the Board of Health has "supervision
over the sanitation, healthfulness and cleanliness of swimming pools . . ." under FLA. STAT.
§ 514.02 (1969), power to make regulations over water safety is given to the Hotel and
Restaurant Commission throughout ch. 509 of the Statutes, where the safety of guests is
stressed as the concern of the Commission. But see [1941-1942] FLA. ATT'y GEN. BIENNIAL
REP. 667 (Board of Health has supervision over pools operated by specific organizations, i.e.,
churches, private schools). See also Lewis v. Florida State Board of Health, 143 So.2d 867
(Fla. 1st Dist. 1962) (Board lacked power to regulate the commercial spraying-pesticide
industry). "(I)t is simply a case where a board has decided that a field is open for regulation,




standard of care.2" Armed with the decisions requiring lifeguards in pools
operated for profit, and utilizing a regulation not directly applicable, the
result was inevitable.24
The impact of the instant case is twofold. As noted, it is the first
case directly considering the sufficiency of a complaint based on a breach
of a common law duty requiring lifeguards for apartment swimming pools.
As far-reaching as are its implications upon a landlord's duty, so too is
the method of approach used by the court in reaching the decision. By
casting off the stagnant mechanical canon of construction and allowing
a jury to consider a regulation not specifically germaine, the court is able
to coordinate tort liability and legislative policy without being unduly
restricted by the limiting words of the regulation.
Yet while providing further protection for the swimmer, the court
left unanswered several questions necessary to determine the extent of
that protection. First, the court, consistent with general tort law, treated
plaintiff-lessee's son as an invitee to whom the landlord owed the duty of
reasonable care. There was no discussion, however, of either the circum-
stances which warranted such a classification or the extent of the land-
lord's duty to others not so classified.25 Second, the court was silent as to
whether every apartment house, irrespective of the number of units, will
fall under this rule. While the court's rationale for extension of the rule
appeared to be on an invitee theory similar to the swimmers in the public
pool cases, there was no contention made by the plaintiff that any fee was
charged or that large numbers of persons were allowed to use the pool.
If this rule is applied to the two or three unit apartment house, the'
polemics of "duty toward the public who pays" is lost. In this writer's
opinion, the degree of care should be commensurate with the surrounding
facts and circumstances. Thus, the tremendous economic burden on the
small apartment owner, as compared with the slight risk involved, may
mean that the small apartment owner is under no duty to pay for super-
vision of his pool. The instant decision tells the landlord that he may be
liable for failing to equip his swimming pool with lifeguards but leaves
him to speculate the specifics of that liability.
SUSAN G. CHOPIN
23. Accord, Edmonds, Inc. v. Voika, 332 F.2d 309 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Mozer v. Semenza,
177 So.2d 880 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965) (grandfather clause).
24. But cf. Lipnick v. Sabal Palm Apartments, Inc., 151 So.2d 866 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963)
(a 504-unit apartment complex has no duty to furnish a guard on a toddler's playground).
25. For example, in Adler v. Copeland, 105 So.2d 594 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1958), the court held
that a toddler who often had been invited by the homeowner's children to play on the
property was a licensee. While recovery was granted for the toddler's drowning death, it was
because the homeowner was found guilty of wilful and wanton negligence toward an infant,
and not a breach of duty toward an invitee.
